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I 
The relationship between law and morality represents a 
major theme in jurisprudence and is the subject-matter of this 
article. I shall focus on the use of the criminal law to enforce 
morality and, in particular, I shall consider whether an identi-
fiable line can be drawn between moral standards that may 
properly be the subject of legal enforcement and those that 
may not. This issue was, of course, central to the Hart-Devlin 
debate. The immediate catalyst to that debate was the publica-
tion in Britain of the Report of the Wolfenden Committee I 
which, among other things, recommended that male homosex-
ual conduct be decriminalized. The debate broadly echoed that 
conducted in the 19th century between the great political 
philosopher John Stuart Mill and Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, 
who was arguably the pre-eminent criminal law judge in late-
Victorian England.2 In broad outline Mill, Hart and the 
Wolfenden Committee advocated the liberal cause while 
Stephen and Devlin are generally seen as legal moralists. In 
the heady days of the 1960s, and perhaps for many years after-
wards, Hart was largely thought to have had the better of the 
* 
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debate, to have trumped Devlin's supposedly outmoded, 
superstitious (and let it be said religiously inspired) conser-
vatism with a convincing statement of liberal and secular prin-
ciples that best reflected the values of personal autonomy. 
However, with the passage of time things do not seem so clear-
cut and I shall suggest that for all its flaws there is something 
of merit in Devlin's argument and that it offers insights we 
should not ignore. 
The question that arises is whether the law should be used 
to enforce a particular view of morality, a matter that has been 
the focus of debate between liberal and conservative commen-
tators. Mill trenchantly set out the liberal case in his celebrated 
essay On Liberty. He wrote that "the sole end for which 
mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in inter-
fering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-
protection".3 Accordingly, he argued that the right to limit 
individual freedom is restricted: 4 
the only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any 
member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm 
to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient 
warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it 
will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, 
because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise or even 
right. 
Thus Mill would confine the power of the state to regulate to 
cases where harm to others is threatened, the so-called "harm 
principle". It is clear that he would deny the state the right to 
act paternalistically, on a view of what is in the best interests 
of its citizens. Equally, the state is not entitled to enforce a 
code of morality (unless the relevant regulation can be inde-
pendently justified on the grounds of harm prevention). 
However, Mill qualified these views. The principle of liberty 
applies to those who are in "the full maturity of their facul-
ties"S and it followed that the liberty of children could properly 
be restricted in their own best interests. By analogy, the same 
3. On Liberty (Penguin Classics, 1974), p. 68. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid., at p. 69. 
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consideration would apply to other categories, such as the 
mentally incompetent, who lack "the full maturity of their fac-
ulties". This protection is sometimes thought of as "soft pater-
nalism" but it must be distinguished from the paternalism that 
Mill condemned.6 Despite these qualifications Mill's "simple 
principle" has been widely endorsed and has become a slogan 
for the liberal cause. 
Writing as a political philosopher Mill did not draw a dis-
tinction between legal and moral sanctions: his work discussed 
the legal and moral restraints that may be imposed on individ-
ual liberty. On the other hand, the principal interest of his 
adversary Stephen was with the contents of the criminal law. 7 
Stephen contended that part of the law's purpose was to grat-
ify "the feeling of hatred" that the prospect of criminal conduct 
stimulates in the minds of right thinking people. He recognized 
that the criminal law was concerned with the "grosser forms of 
vice" and lesser forms, "mere vice", fell beyond its remit. In 
this his views were not substantially different from those of 
Mill, and in the modem idiom would be accommodated within 
the principle of minimalism that is said to circumscribe the 
criminallaw.8 However, Stephen took the view that the crimi-
nal law as it existed at the time "could hardly be regarded as 
imposing any restraint on decent people which is ever felt as 
such".9 In other words, the range of prohibitions that the crim-
inal law imposed at that time could not properly be considered 
to amount to an inappropriate restriction of personal freedom. 
In his view, a number of factors could properly shape the crim-
inal law, including the moral climate in which it operates, a 
concern for the "incurable weakness of human nature" and 
societal revulsion at the "grosser forms of vice". These factors 
6. It might be noted that application of Mill's hann principle was confined to 
"advanced" nations; the situation of "those backward states of society" was 
equated with an individual's lack of capacity. He wrote that "[d]espotism is a 
legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians provided the end be 
their improvement". 
7. Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 
8. See Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), pp. 33-37. 
9. Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, supra, footnote 7, at p 144. 
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do not provide as apparently clear-cut a criterion as Mill's 
harm principle, but instead they operate as broad guidelines to 
the proper limits of the criminal law. Stephen's confidence in 
the state of the criminal law as it existed in late-Victorian 
England might now strike us as being astonishingly compla-
cent and his robust Christianity and arguably elitist viewslO are 
hardly in tune with the secular and democratic spirit of this 
age. 
II 
The Hart-Devlin debate was stimulated by the publication, 
in 1957, ofthe Report of the Wolfenden Committee, which rec-
ommended the decriminalization of male homosexual conduct 
and the regulation of prostitution-related activities. The back-
ground to the debate was completed by the decision several 
years later in Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions ll in 
which the House of Lords held conspiracy to corrupt public 
morals was an offence known to the law. To support its case 
for the liberalization of the law the Wolfenden Committee 
invoked the harm principle and suggested that there is a realm 
of private conduct that is "in brief and crude terms not the 
law's business". In Shaw the House of Lords took a different 
tack and argued that one of the functions of the criminal law 
was to protect the public moral welfare: to this end, Viscount 
Simonds opined that the courts enjoyed a residual power to 
recognize or create new offences where this course of action 
was demanded by the interests of public morality. 
Devlin took issue with the central proposition in the 
Wolfenden Report. 12 He acknowledged that the harm principle 
.could explain the core prohibitions of the criminal law (such as 
murder, rape, assault, theft) but, in his view, that principle is 
10. See Uberty, Equality, Fraternity, ibid., at p. 32: "We agree that the minority are 
wise and the majority foolish, but Mr Mill denies that the wise minority are ever 
justified in coercing the foolish majority, whereas I affirm that under circum-
stances they may be justified in doing so ... in my opinion the wise minority are 
the rightful masters of the foolish majority". 
11. [1962] A.C. 220. 
12. The Enforcement of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University· Press, 1965). 
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not the sole criterion. He contended that that principle does not 
explain the criminalization of consensual conduct which by its 
nature does not cause harm to others and to this end he 
referred, inter alia, to the prohibition of voluntary euthanasia, 
suicide pacts, duelling, abortion and sibling incest. Those are 
acts which can "be done in private and without offence to oth-
ers and need not involve the corruption or exploitation of oth-
ers ... [t]hey can be brought within [the criminal law] only as 
a matter of moral principle".\3 To Devlin a sense of public 
morality is vital to the integrity of society. On this view a 
shared moral perspective is the cement that holds society 
together and a dislodging of public morality threatens the 
structure of society itself: 14 
society means a community of ideas; without shared ideas on politics, 
morals, and ethics no society can exist ... If men and women try to 
create a society in which there is no fundamental agreement about 
good and evil they will fail; if having based it on common agreement, 
the agreement goes, the society will disintegrate. For society is not 
something that is kept together physically; it is held by the invisible 
bonds of common thought . . . A common morality is part of the 
bondage. The bondage is part of the price of society; and mankind, 
which needs society must pay its price. 
Devlin went further and stated that "[m]orals and religion 
are inextricably linked" and that "the moral standards of 
Western civilization are those belonging to Christianity". 15 
However, it should be emphasized that he did not contend that 
Christian morals should be enforced in their own right through 
the mechanism of the criminal law; in this respect he was no 
theocrat. He made a more subtle point: for the purposes of the 
criminal law there was no discernible difference between 
"Christian morals and those which every right minded member 
of society is expected to hold" .16 He was also careful to ensure 
that this notion of public morality would not become a vehicle 
13. Ibid., at p. 7. 
14. Ibid. ,at p. 10. 
15. Ibid., at p. 4. 
16. Ibid., at p. 23. Devlin also expressed the view that the "free-thinker and non-
Christian" could accept that Christian morality formed the basis of the criminal 
law. 
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for needless intolerance. The individual has rights which 
should be taken into account and "[n]othing should be pun-
ished by the law that does not lie beyond the limits of toler-
ance".17 In this respect he drew a distinction between conduct 
that is disliked by the majority and a "real feeling of reproba-
tion". Prohibition should be based on the latter not the former 
and the task of the lawmaker is to identify the boundary 
between the two. He recognized that the limits of tolerance 
shift, thus acknowledging that conceptions of public morality 
evolve and develop. However, "[n]ot everything is to be toler-
ated. No society can do without intolerance, indignation, and 
disgust; they are the forces behind the moral law ... "}S 
The liberal viewpoint was articulated by Hart who took 
Mill's dictum as his starting point. 19 However, he qualified this 
by accepting that it is permissible to legislate in order to pro-
tect the vulnerable from exploitation. In his view the rules that 
exclude the victim's consent in murder and assault can be 
explained as exercises in legal paternalism "designed to pro-
tect individuals against themselves".20 This marks a significant 
departure from the position suggested by the harm principle, as 
Hart indeed recognized, but he contended that paternalist reg-
ulation is an accepted fact of social life. The core of Hart's the-
sis is that society cannot be identified with a particular set of 
views on morality, a point that is at odds with Devlin's central 
theme. Moreover, he drew a distinction between questions of 
morality and of public decency, accepting that the law might 
appropriately prohibit conduct on the basis that it offends pub-
lic decency. He noted, for instance, that sexual conduct that is 
generally permissible becomes an affront to public decency if 
it takes place in public.21 However, true to his liberal beliefs he 
17. Ibid., at pp. 16-17. 
18. Ibid., at p. 17. 
19. Law, Liberty and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963). 
20. Ibid., at p. 31. 
21. Ibid., at p. 45: "Sexual intercourse between husband and wife is not immoral, but 
if it takes place in public it is an affront to public decency. Homosexual inter-
course between consenting adults in private is immoral according to conventional 
morality, but not an affront to public decency, though it would be both if it took 
place in public." 
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rejected the notion that conduct might be prohibited on the 
ground that mere knowledge of its occurring might cause 
shock or offence to others: 22 
If distress incident to the belief that others are doing wrong is harm, so 
also is the distress incident to the belief that others are doing what you 
do not want them to do. To punish people for causing this form of dis-
tress would be tantamount to punishing them simply because others 
object to what they do; and the only liberty that could coexist with this 
extension of the utilitarian principle is liberty to do those things to 
which no one seriously objects. Such liberty is plainly nugatory. 
Recognition of individual liberty as a value involves, as a minimum, 
acceptance of the principle that the individual may do what he wants, 
even if others are distressed when they learn what it is he does -
unless, of course, there are other good grounds for forbidding it. No 
social order which accords to individual liberty any value could also 
accord the right to be protected from distress thus occasioned. 
III 
The enforcement of sexual morality was its immediate con-
text but the general terms in which the Hart-Devlin debate was 
conducted show that its scope is much broader and it is rele-
vant to other forms of private behaviour: drug-taking, private 
use of pornographic material, gambling and animal cruelty are 
examples. A number of justifications might be invoked in sup-
port of prohibiting these activities, including a paternalistic 
determination of what is in an individual's best interests, pub-
lic decency, public sentiment, feelings of revulsion or disgust 
as well as public morality. However, it is difficult to bring pro-
hibition in these cases within the harm principle, at least as it 
was classically articulated by Mill: the conduct in question 
occurs in private and does not "harm" others. Similar consid-
erations arise in relation to laws that require the wearing of 
seat belts and crash helmets. Nevertheless, such is the endur-
ing ideological appeal of the harm principle that it is frequently 
invoked to justify prohibitions. Thus it is said that drug-taking 
harms society in that drug users are liable to become a charge 
on the public purse: as a result of their conduct it is likely that 
22. Ibid., at p. 47 (emphasis added). 
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they will rely on publicly funded health and social welfare 
programmes and that this is a type of indirect harm that is 
properly a matter of societal concern. However, even if this is 
the case it does not necessarily follow that the use of the crim-
inallaw is appropriate. Other measures that have a less restric-
tive impact on individual liberty might be employed such as 
taxation, the withdrawing of entitlements to public assistance 
or the placing of the costs of such conduct on the individuals 
who engage in them. I express no particular opinion on this 
point but it seems to me that those who derive their views from 
Mill have a case to answer. By the same token, the harm prin-
ciple has been invoked in support of the imposition of stricter 
prohibitions of pornographic and violent literature, films and 
videos: a link is said to exist between exposure to such mate-
rials and violence against women and children. These efforts 
to justify the various prohibitions in terms of harm stretch the 
principle to such an extent that the reworked concept of harm 
becomes nebulous.23 Hart implicitly acknowledged this diffi-
culty in his qualified adoption of Mill's proposition and his 
recognition that grounds other than harm, including paternal-
ism and public decency, might justify legal prohibition. 
However, it should be noted that other liberal theorists would 
eschew paternalism as a permissible rationale. A further diffi-
culty that Hart and others tend to overlook is that the concept 
of harm itself, as MacCormick has observed, is "morally 
loaded".24 The decision to classify a consequence as "harm" 
with a view to its prohibition involves a societal judgment that 
is essentially moral in nature. It runs into claims of individual 
liberty and the reasons that are accepted as being sufficient to 
limit that freedom will depend on the decision-maker's evalu-
ation of the competing normative propositions that are 
advanced. 
23. See Harcourt, 'The Collapse of the Harm Principle' (1999), 90 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 109; Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, supra, footnote 8, at 
pp.44-45. 
24. N. McCormick, Legal Right and Social Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1982), p. 29. 
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Hart's thesis became the prevailing orthodoxy of the 1960s~ 
and it still enjoys the ringing endorsement of commentators 
and theorists. Joel Feinberg took up the liberal cause in his 
four-volume work The Moral Limits o/the Criminal LaW.26 He 
adopted the harm principle as it was articulated by Mill but 
would add the causing of offence to others, what he termed the 
"offence principle", as a justification for criminalization.27 
However, he contended that paternalism and moralism could 
not properly be invoked in support of penalizing conduct. 
IV 
As matters transpired the years following the Hart-Devlin 
debate witnessed a general liberalization of the criminal law, 
especially in regard to matters that might be considered to lie 
within the domain of private morality. This was achieved both 
by the enactment of reforming legislation and by judicial 
means, the latter in the form of recognizing constitutional 
rights of privacy. In Britain, suicide and male homosexual con-
duct had been decriminalized and abortion legalized by the end 
of the 1960s. In the United States, the Supreme Court held in 
a series of decisions that the right of privacy protected, inter 
alia, the use of pornographic materials in the home,28 the use 
of contraceptives by married couples;29 and in Roe v. Wade, a 
famous and still controversial decision, it held that the right 
included the right to terminate a pregnancy. 30 These develop-
ments might be taken to amount to an endorsement of liberal 
25. Lee, Law and Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 28. 
26. Harm to Others (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Offense to Others 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985); Harm to Self (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1986); Harmless Wrongdoing (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1990). 
27. Alexander, "Hann, Offense, and Morality" (1994), 7 Can. J. Law & Juris. 199 has 
argued that there is little difference between the offence principle, as articulated 
by Feinberg, and legal moralism: "the Offense Principle covers most of the terri-
tory that Legal Moralism might otherwise occupy" (ibid., at p. 213). 
28. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 US 557 (1969). 
29. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965). 
30. Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113 (1973). 
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thesis and a corresponding rejection of that associated with 
Devlin. 
However, the foregoing catalogue does not paint the full 
picture and examples abound of liberty limiting laws that seem 
to rest on considerations of morality. The American and Irish 
Supreme Courts have held that constitutional rights of privacy 
do not invalidate laws that penalize male homosexual conduct. 
In Bowers v. Hardwick31 the majority of the U.S. court held 
that it was constitutionally permissible to base laws on what 
are essentially moral choices. In the Irish case, Norris v. 
Attorney General,32 the majority reinforced broadly similar 
reasoning by alluding to the condemnation of homosexual 
conduct by Christian teaching as being "gravely sinful". My 
point is not whether those decisions were convincing; in fact I 
believe that they were flawed and find the reasoning unper-
suasive. What is significant for present purposes is that moral 
considerations, or perhaps more accurately what the courts in 
those cases thought were moral considerations,33 prevailed 
over arguments from autonomy. 
Individual liberty is also compromised by an array of laws 
that do not seem to be based on considerations of harm (or, for 
that matter, paternalism) but are better explained as resting on 
moral rationales. Examples include laws that prohibit consen-
sual adult incest, bestiality, animal cruelty and (in various 
American states) fornication, adultery and necrophilia, as well 
as consensual killing and injuring. These counter-examples do 
not amount to a negation of the liberal case but at the least they 
call for comment. One plausible answer from the liberal per-
31. 478 US 186 (1986). 
-32. [1984] IR 36. The European Court of Human Rights later ruled that the measure 
violated the plaintiffs right under the European Convention of Human Rights: 
Norris v.lreland (1988). 13 EHRR 186. Homosexuality was eventually decrimi-
nalized: Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1993. 
33. See Murphy, "Moral Reasons and the Limitation of Liberty" (1999), 40 Wm. and 
Mary L. Rev. 947 at p. 952, suggesting that the U.S. court failed to consider three 
vital questions that arise in relation to a claim that moral conviction may justify 
a criminal law: (i) did a majority of the citizens in fact disapprove of the practice 
in question; (ii) if so, was that disapproval moral in nature; and (iii) if the disap-
proval is moral in nature, is it rational or reasonable. 
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spective is that all or some of these laws involve an indefensi-
ble curtailment of individual liberty and cannot stand. In the 
alternative, a liberal might seek to show that in fact the various 
proscriptions fall within the harm principle or cause offence 
or, in case of theorists like Hart, amount to legitimate pater-
nalism. In this event the proponent will face a considerable 
burden of proof in regard to most of the examples cited;34 per-
haps it might be most easily discharged in the case of incest. 
I wish to examine several cases in slightly more detail. It has 
long been established that an individual may not consent to the 
infliction of serious personal violence. This general proposi-
tion was endorsed in R. v. Brown33 where the House of Lords 
held that the consensual infliction of injury by sado-masochis-
tic homosexuals was criminal and the accused were convicted 
on a variety of serious assault charges. In reaching this con-
clusion the Law Lords adopted a line of earlier decisions to the 
effect that legally operative consent is limited to trivial degrees 
of force, defined as force that is not likely to result in actual 
bodily harm. The majority approved the statement of law by 
the English Court of Appeal in Attorney-General's Reference 
(No 6 of 1980): "it is not in the public interest that people 
should try to cause or should cause each other actual bodily 
harm for no good reason". 
The dividing line between the lawful and unlawful is hap-
hazardly drawn. It is accepted that "ritual circumcision, tattoo-
ing,ear-piercing and violent sports including boxing are 
lawful activities".36 On the other hand, case law has established 
that sexual gratification is not a good reason for raising the 
threshold of permissible force/7 nor is consensual fighting,38 
nor an agreement by a wife that her husband may beat her if 
34. It is perhaps significant that Goldberg J. in his concurring opinion in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 US 497 (1965), considered the constitutionality of adultery and 
fornication laws to be "beyond doubt". 
35. R. v. Brown, [1994] 1 AC. 212 (H.L.). 
36. Ibid., at p. 231 per Lord Templeman. 
37. R. v. Donovan, [1934] 2 K.B. 498 (C.C.A); R. v. Brown, supra, footnote 35; 
People v. Samuels, 250 Cal App 2d 501 (1967). 
38. Attorney-General's Reference (No 6 of 1980), [1981] Q.B. 715 (C.A); R. v. 
Jobidon (1991), 66 C.C.C. (3d) 454, 7 C.R. (4th) 233, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 714. 
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she consumes alcohol. 39 It is difficult to see how the activities 
in question could be considered harmful once the "victim" has 
consented (assuming of course that he or she had the capacity 
to consent). Moreover, the Court of Appeal decision has side-
lined the possibility of invoking a justification based on the 
interests of preserving the public peace. It is significant that 
the court abandoned the rationale (for which there had been 
support in earlier decisions, most notably R. v. ConeyO) that 
fighting poses a threat to public order.41 The position now is 
that consensual fighting is unlawful irrespective of its effects 
on public order: a private consensual fight is unlawful because, 
in the words of the Court of Appeal, there is no "good reason" 
to recognize it as lawful. In effect, the burden of justification 
falls on those who urge the lawfulness of that activity rather 
than on those who seek to curtail liberty by declaring it unlaw-
ful. These prohibitions cast doubt on the liberal position. Hart 
might invoke a paternalistic rationale, at least in some of these 
cases, but that position was eschewed by Mill and is rejected 
by many modem advocates of the liberal cause, most notably 
Feinberg. 
I might also mention two other issues that have been the 
subject of recent legal intervention. Laws have been passed in 
a number of common law countries outlawing female circum-
cision, what is now also referred to as female genital mutila-
tion.42 In other jurisdictions it is likely that female circumcision 
would be found to come within the law of assault. The sale of 
human organs for transplant has also been prohibited by statute 
in a number of countries.43 It is significant that these acts are 
39. State v. Brown, 364 A 2d 27 (1976). 
40. (1882), 8 Q.B.D. 534. 
41. [1981] Q.B. 715: "we have not followed the dicta which would make an act (even 
if consensual) an assault if it occurred in public, on the ground that it constituted 
a breach of the peace, and was therefore unlawful. These dicta reflect the condi-
tions of the times when they were uttered, when there was little by the way of an 
established police force and prize-fights were a source of civil disturbance. 
Today, with regular policing, conditions are different." 
42. E.g., Prohibition of Female Circumcision Act 1985 (U.K.); Crimes (Female 
Genital Mutilation) Amendment Act 1994 (New South Wales). 
43. E.g., Human Tissues Gift Act 1972 (Ontario); Human Tissue Act 1982 (Victoria); 
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unlawful irrespective of the consent of the complainant. A per-
son of full age and capacity is denied the opportunity to do 
with his or her body as he or she pleases. However, I suspect 
that few reasonable people would consider these laws to 
involve an inappropriate intrusion into individual liberty or, to 
borrow Stephen's words, that these prohibitions represent a 
"restraint on decent people which is ever felt as such". 
Furthermore, I think that most "decent people" would consider 
legislative intervention in these matters to be warranted. In 
other words, the general public belief is that it is proper for 
law-makers to criminalize these activities. The reasons for 
those sentiments hardly need to be stated. Yet from a liberal 
perspective this is the type of curtailment of liberty that is 
problematic. The fact that the legislature or the majority of the 
public might view the acts in question with distaste or revul-
sion or consider them to violate the best interests of the "vic-
tim" is neither here nor there. If the liberal position is to have 
any meaning it surely must be to afford legal protection to 
preferences that deviate from those of the majority. 
One response that might be offered by liberals is to query 
the nature of the consent in cases of the type under discussion. 
On this basis it might be suggested that it is doubtful whether 
a "true consent" would or could ever be given to acts such as 
female circumcision or commercial organ donation. It would 
not be difficult to identify circumstantial constraints, be they 
cultural or economic, that Gould be said to deprive a supposed 
consent of a voluntary character. But this comes close to say-
ing: "I do not believe you truly consented because your choice 
is so irresponsible and so irrational that no sensible person 
could have made it." I believe that Mill's disciples are 
estopped from adopting that argument unless they are prepared 
to modify their thesis and to allow at least a limited role for 
paternalism and/or legal moralism. Another version of the 
argument is to acknowledge that true consent might be given 
in such cases but to focus on the danger of consent being viti-
National Organs Transplants Act 1984 (U.S.); Human Organ Transplants Act 
1990 (U.K.). 
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ated by coercion or other factors. On this pragmatic view, if 
the risk of the latter is unacceptably high it might be thought 
prudent to withdraw legal approval from all cases; the cost of 
restricting the liberty of those who truly consent is outweighed 
by the benefit of protecting those who might be coerced or 
exploited. However, a position of this type accepts that a per-
son's freedom of action may be limited in the interests of oth-
ers who are not affected by anything done by that person and 
again it forces liberals to reconsider their position. 
The purpose of this brief survey is to show that considera-
tions other than harm might be advanced in support of laws 
that curtail individual liberty. The range of "good reason[s]" 
that might be relied on is open-ended and different rationales 
for criminalizing are invoked in different contexts. Harm is 
one, and as I noted at the beginning of this talk, it can be seen 
to underpin the major offences in the criminal calendar: mur-
der, rape, assault, theft and the like. But, as I have suggested, 
there are many other offences that cannot be brought within 
the harm principle and other justifications must be sought. 
Different versions of liberal theory acknowledge that paternal-
ism, offence to others and pragmatic concerns might legiti-
mately be invoked but seem to deny a role for moral 
considerations. However, in many such cases a sense that the 
proscribed conduct is wrongful is as plausible an explanation 
as others that are offered and that sense often is the real moti-
vating force behind the enactment of the prohibition. By the 
same token, decriminalization is liable to occur when it is no 
longer felt that the conduct in question violates a social norm 
(or is required as a protective measure). Ultimately it is prob-
ably futile to seek a single unifying criterion that distinguishes 
the lawful from the unlawful. The only safe conclusion, which 
was alluded to in R. v. Brown and is obvious in Attorney-
General's Reference (No 6 of 1980), is that certain forms of 
conduct are socially tolerated and others are not. Thus male 
circumcision, contact sports, professional boxing and rough 
horseplay are tolerated while female circumcision, commercial 
organ donation, consensual fighting, bestiality and animal cru-
elty are not. I suggest that it is fair to conclude that the latter 
activities are considered wrongful, while the former are not, 
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and that the judgment of wrongfulness is legitimately taken 
into account in the decision to criminalize. And this takes us 
back to Devlin. 
V 
There are flaws in Devlin's essay. Some might consider that 
he moves rather too easily from the descriptive to the norma-
tive, confusing the "is" with the "ought": on this view the fact 
that conduct is currently criminal does not justify the conclu-
sion that it ought to be so. Devlin is also criticized for his sug-
gestion that a sense of public morality is central to the structure 
of society and that society would disintegrate were public 
morality undermined.44 Certainly, history has shown that soci-
eties are adaptable, that they are capable of surviving signifi-
cant change and it is obvious that the legal reforms that have 
been enacted in the years since Devlin wrote have not threat-
ened the social fabric. Nonetheless, there is a certain (perhaps 
intuitive) appeal to Devlin's views on this point and it cannot 
be denied that a society is characterized by a set of common 
values and agreed norms. Liberal theorists generally accept 
this and indeed the notion of a set of accepted values underpins 
their theories. Their disagreement with Devlin is principally on 
the source and nature of the particular values chosen. Devlin 
might also be taken to task for equating public morality with 
that of Christianity. It is plainly at odds with the secularism 
that underpins liberal theory to root a societal vision in a reli-
gious belief and it was only to be expected that proponents of 
liberalism would react with hostility. This objection is partic-
ularly strong in societies such as the United States where the 
separation of church and state assumes constitutional signifi-
cance. The point might also be made that Western society, or 
Western Europe at least, has entered a post-Christian phase. 
44. E.g., Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality, supra, footnote 19, at pp. 50-52; R. 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977), pp. 242-55; 
Murphy, "Legal Moralism and Liberalism" (1995), 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 73 at pp. 76-
77 suggests that Devlin's argument is essentially utilitarian in nature and that he 
differs from Mill only on "issues of empirical evidence of social harm". 
30 Criminal Law Quarterly [Vol. 47 
This is especially evident in declining church attendance and 
. the decreasing relevance of religious beliefs and practice in 
people's lives. However, it would be an exaggeration to con-
clude from this that the Western societies are no longer 
Christian. Christianity, or perhaps more accurately the Judaeo-
Christian ethical tradition, has shaped the development of the 
Western world for many centuries and the practices of the cur-
rent generation cannot shake off that legacy. It is possible to 
overstate this criticism of Devlin. As I explained earlier Devlin 
did not argue for the enforcement of Christian morals as such; 
his more subtle point was that as far as the criminal law was 
concerned there was no difference between the standards of 
Christian morality and that which the "right minded member 
of society is expected to uphold" . This facilitates a secular 
. evaluation of morality or at least one that is not expressly reli-
gious. in nature. 
Despite these flaws, if in fact one so considers them, Devlin 
provides valuable insights and a renewed recognition of the 
cogency of Devlin's arguments is discernible among some 
commentators.4S In the first place, he highlighted a trouble-
some inconsistency in the liberal argument: he contended that 
its rejection of legal moralism is inconsistent with its prefer-
ence for retributive punishment, that is, the idea that the sanc-
tion imposed on an offender ought to reflect his or her degree 
of blameworthiness. Thus there is general recognition that the 
accused's personal culpability is a relevant criterion in deter-
mining the appropriate sanction. It is accepted that a poor per-
son who steals merits a lesser sentence than the affluent thief; 
and one who steals to feed his or her dependants will be treated 
less harshly than the habitual offender for whom theft is a cho-
sen way of life. The punishment must fit the crime. This stance 
involves moral considerations and does not confine the deter-
mination of the quantum of punishment to the social goals of 
deterrence and harm prevention.46 By the same token character 
45. See, e.g., G. Dworkin, "Devlin was Right: Law and the Enforcement of Morality" 
(1999), 40 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 927; Murphy, "Legal Moralism and 
Liberalism" (1995), 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 73. 
46. See Murphy, "Legal Moralism and Liberalism", ibid., at p. 79. 
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failings that are displayed by an accused are apt to aggravate 
sentence. Where relevant, a court will describe the offender's 
conduct as wicked, heinous, callous or depraved, language that 
is pregnant with moral overtones. Liberal theorists are happy 
to accept this position but would deny the state the right to pro-
hibit "harmless" conduct on the grounds that it breaches the 
norms of what they call "conventional" morality. Murphy has 
tersely (and perhaps a little cruelly) summarized the contra-
diction in the liberal position:41 
Liberals such as Mill and Hart do not think that it is legitimate to crim-
inalize homosexuality simply because it is perceived as a vice, and yet 
they see no problem in punishing particularly vicious criminals more 
severely than those of greater virtue. Is this not simply an inconsis-
tency? Are not Mill and Hart and [Ronald] Dworkin simply being 
unprincipled when they claim that the criminal law should be con-
cerned only with harm and not with personal vice and virtue? Is not 
their so-called principle simply a slogan that they trot out only when 
it serves their own sexually permissive ideology? 
Hart sought to answer the charge of inconsistency by argu-
ing that the question of what forms of conduct should be made 
criminal is "distinct and independent"48 from the question of 
how severely different offences should be punished. 
Punishment may be graded for utilitarian reasons (such as fear 
of bringing the law into disrepute) or for reasons of fairness 
(such as treating like offences alike). However, Hart argued 
that this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it is 
justifiable to criminalize immoral conduct on that account 
alone. To this end he contended that: 49 
[liberal theorists] can in perfect consistency insist on the one hand that 
the only justification for having a system of punishment is to prevent 
harm and only harmful conduct should be punished, and, on the other, 
agree that when the question of quantum of punishment for such con-
duct is raised, we should defer to principles which make relative moral 
wickedness of different offenders a partial determinant in the severity 
of punishment. 
47. Ibid., at p. 81. 
48. Law, Liberty and Morality, supra, footnote 19, at p. 36. 
49. Ibid., at p. 37 (emphasis in original). 
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This observation, and in particular the distinction between sys-
tem and quantum, hints at Hart's notion of the general justify-
ing aim of punishment that he developed elsewhere. 50 Feinberg 
employed the latter idea and contended that it was consistent 
to argue that the purpose of deterring harm (the general justi-
fying aim) should be modified by the operation of fair proce-
dural rules. 51 Thus, if one's sense of fairness demands 
punishment according to the offender's moral desert that 
should be reflected in the quantum of punishment. However, it 
is doubtful whether the question of punishment is merely one 
of fair procedures that can be divorced from a general justify-
ing aim of punishment. If the latter is meaningful it must 
accommodate the graduation of punishment that is accepted by 
liberals and legal moralists alike. In other words, Feinberg's 
fair procedures must fit within his general theory of punish-
ment. The attempt to transfer the moral issue from being a 
matter of general theory to one of procedures is unconvincing. 
In this regard, Hart was more candid in admitting that the 
inclusion of moral factors into the assessment of punishment 
represented a compromise with his general theory. 52 
The second point of importance in Devlin's essay is his con-
clusion that "it is not possible to set theoretical limits to the 
power of the State to legislate against immorality".53 In this, of 
course, he differs from liberal theorists, in that the latter seek 
to identify a "simple principle" that marks the legitimate 
boundaries of the criminal law. However, Devlin did not con-
tend that all immoral conduct should be criminalized for that 
reason alone, much less that the law should enforce Christian 
morals as such. His point was that it is permissible for the State 
to proscribe conduct on the grounds that it is immoral or, to put 
50. Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968). 
51. Harmless Wrongdoing, supra, footnote 26, at pp. 147-51. 
52. Law, Liberty and Morality, supra, footnote 19, at p. 38: "in the theory of punish-
ment, what is in the end morally tolerable is apt to be more complex than our the-
ories initially suggest. We cannot usually in social life pursue a single value or a 
single moral aim, untroubled by the need to compromise with others." 
53. The Enforcement of Morals, supra, footnote 12, at p. 12. 
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it another way, that morality is a legally relevant criterion 
when it comes to determining the contents of the criminal law . 
It is not the only or governing factor and he identified three 
"elastic principles" that should be taken into account. These 
are, first, that allowance should be made for the maximum 
degree of individual freedom that is consistent with the 
integrity of society; second, that on new moral issues the law 
should be slow to act; and third, that as far as possible privacy 
should be protected. He also accepted that the principle of 
minimalism is an appropriate consideration. S4 The question for 
Devlin is one of balancing public interest with individual 
rights and to this end he acknowledged that not all wrongdoing 
can or should be criminalized: "[n]othing should be punished 
by the law that does not lie beyond the limits of social toler-
ance". ss He associated intolerance with a "real feeling of repro-
bation" /6 with a sense of indignation and disgust. These 
sentiments were important both as an indication that the limits 
of tolerance had been breached and in shaping moral judg-
ment.S7 Intolerance, in the sense that Devlin employed the 
term, was to be distinguished from mere prejudice: in his 
words "before a society can put a practice beyond the limits of 
tolerance there must be a deliberate judgement that the prac-
tice is injurious to society". The law-maker must exercise that 
judgment in identifying the limits of social tolerance and thus 
in determining what may properly be criminalized. Devlin also 
recognized that society's evaluation of what is tolerable is 
liable to alter and that this must also be taken into account by 
the legislator. 
54. Ibid., at p. 19: "The last and biggest thing to be remembered is that the law is con-
cerned with the minimum and not with the maximum." 
55. Ibid., at pp. 16-17. 
56. Ibid., at p. 17. 
57. Ibid., at p 17: "Every moral judgement, unless it claims a divine source, is sim-
ply a feeling that no right-minded man could behave in any other way without 
admitting that he was doing wrong. It is the power of common sense and not the 
power of reason that is behind the judgements of society." 
2- 47 c.L.Q. 
34 Criminal Law Quarterly [Vol. 47 
VI 
I suggest that the notion of intolerance, as Devlin explains 
it, is important. It serves to segregate serious wrongdoing from 
the trivial and confines the criminal sanction to the former. In 
this context Devlin's observation that conduct that is tolerated 
is not necessarily approved of is germane. S8 Conservatives 
often oppose the legalization of a particular activity on the 
grounds that the proposal would amount to societal approval: 
thus it is sometimes said that to permit gambling, drinking, 
homosexual acts or whatever is to approve these activities. 
Devlin clearly disagrees and in this he is not too far from the 
liberal position. The lawfulness of many of the acts that I men-
tioned earlier - male circumcision, professional boxing and 
rough horseplay spring to mind - is perhaps best explained on 
the basis that they are, and traditionally have been, tolerated. 
By the same token the criminalization of female circumcision, 
commercial organ transplants and consensual fighting can also 
be understood as lying beyond the limits of social tolerance. 
The notion of tolerance may also be linked to that of social 
demand: perhaps they are different sides of the same coin. By 
social demand I have in mind the circumstances where an 
activity is desired to a sufficient extent to allow or invite a 
societal judgment that it is to be tolerated. Conduct that is 
socially demanded, in this sense, is liable to be tolerated and 
considered lawful. Smoking tobacco, drinking alcohol and 
gambling are to one extent or another demanded by the public 
and for that reason they are lawful. Where an activity is not 
socially demanded, or where it is not demanded with sufficient 
force, it is easier to consider it intolerable and to criminalize it. 
This might explain why certain sexual pursuits are lawful and 
others are not. Liberal societies have come to accept homo-
sexual conduct as tolerable and this no doubt is a consequence 
of political action and the raising of social consciousness by 
58. Ibid., at p. 18. The language of law refonn reflects this point: the repeal of a con-
troversial measure is often described as "decriminalization" (which implies noth-
ing more than a willingness to tolerate) rather than "legalization" (which might 
be taken to indicate approval). 
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groups that sought its decriminalization. In contrast, there is no 
discernible social demand for the legalization of bestiality, 
incest and necrophilia, nor am I aware of any pressure groups 
advocating those activities, and as a result they are currently 
taken to lie beyond the limits of tolerance. The picture, of 
course, is not as black and white as the foregoing might sug-
gest. In some circumstances an activity might be practiced by 
a considerable section of the community yet claims for its 
decriminalization are resisted. Drug use is a good example: the 
growing acceptance of the use of recreational drugs has not yet 
resulted in the adoption of any significant measures towards 
their legalization. Perhaps in time that will happen but, as with 
many other reforms, calls for legalization will be met with 
counter-arguments based on considerations of harm, public 
welfare, paternalism, morality and the like. 
Some years ago the Irish High Court upheld the validity of 
a law that forbids the importation, manufacture and sale of 
chewing tobacco. S9 The case involved a point of European law, 
namely whether the Irish legislation breached the free move-
ment of goods provisions in the Treaty of Rome. The court 
concluded that the State had established that the measure in 
question was justified on public health grounds. The public 
health argument that prevailed was essentially paternalist in 
nature, but I can assure you that the decision did not evoke 
public consternation or disquiet. There was no sense that this 
was regarded as an inappropriate infringement of individual 
liberty or as an intrusion into an inviolable realm of personal 
freedom. However, had the law been directed at all tobacco 
products I have no doubt that public reaction would have been 
quite different. A measure of the latter type would most likely 
have been equated with Prohibition in 1920s America and the 
expected arguments would have been advanced. The explana-
tion for the different reactions is simple. In Ireland there is no 
discernible social demand for chewing tobacco as opposed to 
other forms of tobacco. 
59. United States Tobacco (Ireland) Ltd v. Ireland, [1993] 1 IR 241. 
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VII 
Devlin provides a convincing account of the scope of the 
criminal law . The notion of intolerance together with his "elas-
tic principles" and the concept of minimal ism are the factors 
that properly shape the criminal law. These factors are best 
thought of as approximate guidelines that indicate the bound-
aries of the law rather than as hard and fast criteria. On this 
view of things the boundaries of the law are shaped, and 
always have been shaped, by an amalgam of forces that 
includes the concept of harm and a regard for· personal free-
dom but also embraces paternalistic and moral concerns. The 
result is a much more vague set of guidelines than the liberal 
position would allow but the cardinal point is that "there is no 
principled line following the contours of the distinction 
between immoral and harmful conduct such that only grounds 
referring to the latter may be invoked to justify criminaliza-
tion".60 
Devlin's conservatism should not be confused with anti-lib-
eralism. There is much in The Enforcement of Morality that 
liberals can endorse. He acknowledged the relevance of indi-
vidual rights and personal freedom and accepted the principle 
of minimalism. There are hints in his essay of a belief that the 
criminal law should not, or could not, be used to promote good 
but is to be confined to prohibiting wrongdoing.61 The princi-
pal disagreement between Devlin and his critics relates to sex-
ual conduct, particularly homosexual conduct. It is somewhat 
surprising that liberal theorists seem to concede that homo sex -
ual conduct is immoral62 and instead argue that it falls into the 
realm of private immorality that they contend is no concern of 
the law. Perhaps at the time Hart estimated that public opinion 
in Britain was hostile to homosexuality and his interest was to 
counter what he would have perceived to be majoritarian prej-
60. G. Dworkin, "Devlin was Right: Law and the Enforcement of Morality", supra, 
footnote 45, at p. 928. 
61. The Enforcement of Morals, supra, footnote 12, at p. 19: "there is much in the 
Sermon in the Mount that would be out of place in the Ten Commandments". 
62. See, e.g., R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra, footnote 44, at p. 240. 
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udice: that, however, is a matter of speculation. I suspect that 
in fact liberal theorists do not consider homosexuality to be 
immoral and that sentiment informs their views. Furthermore, 
I find it difficult to comprehend a stance that considers an 
activity to be immoral yet would conclude that the claims of 
individual liberty demand its legalization. I suspect that a 
belief that an activity under scrutiny is not immoral is an unar-
ticulated premise behind liberal claims that the activity should 
not be criminalized. In this event the more enriching debate 
would centre on the morality of the impugned conduct.63 In this 
debate the cogency of the competing moral claims would be 
scrutinized along with the equally important question whether 
those arguments count as moral in the first place. A claim does 
not qualify as being moral simply on account of the language 
in which it is expressed or the strength of feeling that lies 
behind it. A supposed moral objection might be dismissed as 
being prejudicial in nature or as entailing inadmissible consid-
erations.64 Many of the pronouncements of those who call 
themselves the "moral majority" might on closer examination 
be found to lack moral quality. To this extent by seeking to 
deny the relevance of moral claims liberal theorists have ceded 
ground to their conservative opponents rather than engaging 
with them in moral debate. 
I shall conclude my remarks by restating my main point, 
namely that the limits of the criminal law cannot be set by ref-
erence to a "simple principle", be it harm, individual liberty or 
whatever. Instead the boundaries of the law are shaped by a 
63. See G. Dworkin "Devlin was Right: Law and the Enforcement of Morality". 
supra. footnote 45. at p. 946: "I encourage liberals who wish to argue against. for 
example. the criminalization of homosexual sex. to engage in the honest toil of 
arguing that the reason such conduct ought not be criminalized is that there is 
nothing immoral in it" 
64. R. Dworkin. Taking Rights Seriously. supra. footnote 44. at p. 249 lists four types 
of argument that are excluded from moral debate: prejudice. emotional reactions. 
rationalization and parroting. Murphy. "Moral Reasons and the Limitation of 
Liberty" (1999).40 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 947 at p. 954 holds the view that a 
moral judgment is characterized by the reasons advanced in its support; the object 
of the disapproval should involve "harm. injustice or certain failures of human 
flourishing" . 
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variety of forces that operate as broad guidelines rather than as 
clear-cut criteria. Once this is acknowledged it must be 
accepted that it is legitimate and appropriate to take moral con-
siderations into account in determining the contents of the 
criminal law. In short, the law-maker may properly justify a 
prohibition on an appeal to moral reasons. 
